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I became responsible for developing the market for computers in Eastern and Central Europe during the early days of 
the expansion of the computer industry in 1963 until 1974. In this paper, I describe LEO’s successful entry into that 
market to take what I believe to have been a leading position during my period as export manager. We primarily 
achieved this position due to LEO’s achieving a deep understanding of the special features driving this market during 
the Cold War, which enabled LEO to meet the market’s needs more successfully. 
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1 Backstory  
In November 1951, J. Lyons Co Ltd, one of Britain’s foremost food and restaurant businesses (Bird, 
2000), announced and demonstrated the world’s first commercial computer application running on an in-
house computer called LEO: Lyons Electronic Office. LEO was in many respects an unexpected success. 
Interest in the project by industry and commerce persuaded Lyons to set up a subsidiary company, LEO 
Computers Limited, to make and sell computers for business and government use. Following this 
announcement, many of Britain’s major industrial and commercial companies together with several 
government departments purchased LEO computers. 
LEO 1 was a first-generation electronic digital computer that used valves, had a 2000-word store based 
on mercury delay lines, and linked directly to a variety of input and output devices. Its operating software 
was limited, and programming relied on an assembly language intercode. Only one LEO 1 was 
constructed and used both for Lyons own data processing and as a bureau service. LEO 1 was followed 
in the mid-1950s by LEO 2, which was much faster and had a larger store. The later LEO 2s had 
increased speeds largely due to transistors’ replacing valves and core storage’s replacing the mercury 
delay lines (Bird, 1994, page 257). In total, 11 LEO 2s were built (Bird, 1994, p. 234) In turn. LEO 2s were 
replaced in the early 1960s by the LEO 3 range comprising the upward-compatible LEO 3, LEO 360, and 
LEO 326. The LEO 3 range were third-generation computers with multitasking capabilities, a sophisticated 
operating system, the master routine, and a high-level “business” language CLEO (comparable to 
COBOL). 
In 1963, Lyons decided to sell its computer company to another major British multinational company. Also, 
English Electric developed the Marconi family of Computers; hence, the company became English Electric 
LEO Marconi (EELM). The combined company established a new range System 4, which it intended to be 
IBM 360 compatible. Later mergers of all the U.K. computer makers established International Computers 
Limited (ICL), which sold both the LEO System 4 series and the former ICT 1900 series until the 2900 
range of computers replaced both.  
Researchers have thoroughly documented LEO’s story (Bird, 1994; Caminer, Aris, Hermon, & Land, 1997; 
Ferry, 2003; Land, 2012)1. LEO is now widely recognized as the world’s first commercial digital computer. 
Its technical achievements and especially its application experience are well known, as are its subsequent 
failure to counter the strength of competitors, primarily IBM, which led to attempts to consolidate the 
British computer industry through a series of mergers. The English Electric Computer Division, which had 
already incorporated Elliot Automation, merged with LEO to form English Electric LEO Marconi (EELM). 
And, some years later, under strong government pressure, a hoped-for British winner emerged from 
International Computer Technology’s (ICT) merging with EELM to form International Computers Ltd (ICL). 
2 LEO in Eastern Europe 
Less well known is the story of LEO in the Soviet Union and the nations of East and Central Europe, 
which comprised the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact countries (known as COMECON), and Yugoslavia 
(which stayed independent of this grouping). The region’s market differed from the West’s, which created 
a series of exceptional problems and opportunities. Success depended on taking advantage of the 
opportunities and finding ways to overcome the problems In 1964, on the basis that I could speak 
German, LEO’s then Managing Director, T. R. Thompson, asked me to take on the role of export manager 
for a company that had virtually no export business outside the successful LEO companies in South Africa 
and Australia. However, I had the good fortune to have attached to me Daniel Broido, then Chief 
Mechanical Engineer of LEO. 
Broido had been a refugee from Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. He first moved to 
Germany, where he completed his technical education, and came to London in the 1930s. He worked with 
several companies on document reading before Lyons and LEO recruited him in 1954. Broido was a 
                                                     
1  The LEO Computers Society website includes a comprehensive bibliography of material about LEO: see http://www.leo-
computers.org.uk/images/Comp-biblio-240115.pdf  
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pioneer in mark-sensing2, which led to the design and development of the Lector Document Reader and, 
subsequently, the Autolector, the online version. 
In Russia, Broido’s father had been a leading Menshevik, a moderate left-wing party that had led the 
revolution, which Lenin and the Bolsheviks subsequently overthrew. Nevertheless, Broido had kept 
himself well connected in the Soviet Union and with several of the Russian satellite countries. 
Broido had always believed that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact counties provided a unique 
opportunity for LEO. He had already demonstrated as much by introducing LEO to potential customers in 
Czechoslovakia where the National Railways and the Ministry of Social Security (and, subsequently, 
major steelworks in Ostrava: Nova Huta Clementa Gotwald) had duly purchased large LEO 3 systems. 
The decision then to concentrate our non-Commonwealth exports, initially, on the ‘soft underbelly’ of the 
European Market was self-evident and proved to be a remarkable success. 
3 Background: the Market 
The East and Central European market comprised COMECON (the Soviet Union and its satellite nations, 
the DDR (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, plus Tito’s Yugoslavia, and 
Albania). During the Cold War, trade with those countries was limited and restricted for two main reasons. 
In part, COMECON countries were self-isolated from the West and focused on a determination to trade in 
the bloc to achieve economic self-sufficiency, (Kaser, 1967; Zwass, 1989; Cortada, 2008). Perhaps more 
important was the Cold War, which led the Western powers to impose a strategic embargo on the supply 
to the Soviet Bloc of military equipment and dual use equipment (e.g., computers that could be used for 
either civilian or military applications). The Coordinating Committee of NATO (COCOM) enforced the 
Strategic Embargo (Mastanduno, 1992). The Soviet Bloc countries, in consequence of these policies, 
found it difficult to keep up with global developments in technology and were chronically short of 
convertible foreign exchange. 
Although theoretical work on computing had been highly developed in academic projects, computer 
design, manufacture, and usage increasingly lagged behind that of the West (Hally, 2003; Malinovski, 
2006). By the 60s, the countries had barely developed a range of computers at the level of LEO 1 and 
LEO 2 produced in the West in the 50s. Stalin had totally underestimated computers’ potential, and he 
allocated only modest research and development funds to the new industry in successive five-year plans 
in contrast with the efforts and achievements of the bloc in the space programs in that period. In due 
course, the bloc’s weaknesses in computer developments became a major impediment to their space 
program, too. 
By the time Broido had succeeded in opening the Czechoslovak market with the sale of two large LEO 3 
systems (2 x 360, 1 x 326) in the late 60s, several small, early-model Western computers had been 
installed in Russia and other COMECON countries. These computers included the early German Zuses, 
Elliot Automation 503, 803, and 4100 Series, Ferranti Pegasus and Mercury, PDPs, IBM 1401, and, later, 
IBM 360, ICT1300, English Electric, KDP10, KDF8, and KDF6. 
It was becoming clear that, under normal conditions, especially given the needs of centrally planned 
economies, the demand for computing equipment could, as Broido had foreseen, be considerable. 
4 Particular Features of the Market 
4.1 Foreign Trade Organizations 
In the Soviet Bloc, in sharp contrast to a typically Western market, branches of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade handled all computer purchasing through specialized foreign trade organizations (FTOs). The FTOs 
were monopoly buyers, staffed by professionally trained negotiators who usually knew a foreign language 
but who had a limited understanding of the products they were responsible for purchasing on behalf of the 
ultimate end user. 
                                                     
2 Mark sensing readers were designed to read marks made on documents where the value sensed depended on the position on the 
paper of the mark made. For example a salesman would mark the quantity ordered in the appropriate column on a grid printed on 
the order form. 
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To be successful, we had to become skillful negotiators capable of coping with all the stratagems the 
buyers threw at us. 
4.2 Permitting Imports of Computers 
To manage end users, one had to go through a long and complex process to obtain permission to acquire 
an imported computer, which required the permission of their responsible minister, who, in turn, had to 
have the approval of a) the State Committee for Science and Technology; b) the Ministry of Finance to 
ensure that foreign exchange was allocated for the purchase; c) Gosplan, responsible for the planning of 
the Economy and, in particular, the five-year plans; and d) the Security Services to ensure that the 
equipment could not be used for non-approved purposes and were installed in a secure environment. At 
one time, we counted that one required fifteen signatures to purchase a computer. 
A deputy prime minister often had to make the final signature granting the award of a contract to purchase 
a computer from the West. 
4.3 Negotiating Contracts 
The time required from first considering a data-processing project, which required a more powerful 
computer than generally available in the Soviet bloc, to specification, the internal selling of the project, the 
receiving of the necessary authorization, and the starting of the final negotiations leading to a contract 
could be several years. The contract negotiations themselves could be equally protracted. Over this 
period, we had little or no contact with the end user. The only real understanding of their requirements 
depended on our staff’s experience of applications and our limited knowledge of the FTO negotiators 
A typical contact would include detailed schedules of air conditioning equipment, spare parts delivered 
with the equipment (generally sufficient to last for three years as our engineers estimated), and provision 
of training for the end user staff partly on site or in our training schools set up in the branches but, more 
often, in our training facilities in the UK. 
One significant business advantage the potential Western vendor had was the knowledge that, once they 
had been invited to the FTO to come and negotiate the purchase, the FTO had the necessary authority 
and means to pay for the purchase. Another advantage, reflecting the lack of development of commercial 
law, was that the Ministry of Foreign Trade was prepared for the contracts to be executed under the 
commercial conditions of the supplying countries or, more often, under the commercial laws of selected 
countries such as Britain or Sweden.  
Nevertheless, the negotiations were always tough and protracted and not necessarily successful. We 
sometimes negotiated with the knowledge that a competitor might be negotiating in the room next door. 
On one occasion, I was invited to negotiate three separate contracts simultaneously for key ministries 
over the Christmas period while knowing that each end user had been allocated currency for the current 
year and had to complete the purchase before the year finished. In fact, three FTO teams sitting at 
separate tables or sometimes in different rooms called me to negotiate paragraph by paragraph. It was 
rather like playing simultaneous chess. 
4.4 Surveillance of our staff 
The Western computer companies trying to establish themselves in this market had to be aware that they 
and their staff were under close surveillance. In practice, this surveillance was a kind of industrial 
espionage designed to glean as much knowledge as possible of Western computer technology much in 
advance of that available in the Soviet Union at that time. At the same time, we were under strict rules 
from COCOM to limit the passing of advanced technological information to the Soviet Bloc. 
5 Developing the Market 
5.1 Local branches 
We recognized quite early that, if we were to become successful long-term suppliers of computer 
equipment and systems, we would need to develop a deep understanding of the market and its 
requirements, to negotiate clear and comprehensive contracts that could be effectively implemented and 
monitored, and to establish a presence in the market by opening branches in each of the counties. Each 
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branch would have to have sales, customer support service, engineers, and training staff and, thereby, 
learn and understand the requirements of the market, its opportunities, and challenges. 
For example, following Broido’s breakthrough success in selling two LEO systems in Czechoslovakia, we 
opened Branch offices in the then Czechoslovak cities of Prague, Bratislava, and Brno. To underscore our 
determination to stay in each market, we staffed our branches mainly by locally recruited and trained 
personnel that U.K. engineers and systems specialists, sometimes expatriates of the country concerned, 
supported. However, in Yugoslavia, we used a large local Agency company, Inter-Export, that represented 
several important Western businesses. A LEO manager, John Durham, supervised their English Electric 
LEO Marconi (EELM) business. Major successes were the sale of large computer systems to the 
Yugoslav Army and the BOR copper mining complex. 
Over the next few years, we opened similar local branches in all the other Soviet Bloc countries once we 
had established a base of sufficient sales and installed computers to justify the cost. By the early 
seventies, we had an organization in the Soviet Union, mainly in Moscow, of some 30 staff and their 
families. We had set up only the second ever registered British office authorized by the Soviet Union. Our 
total number of staff in the bloc numbered some 120 personnel plus their families. 
Our situation contrasted with all the other Western computer companies seeking to open and penetrate 
this market. They mainly used their German or Austrian offices, situated primarily in Vienna, to send sales 
personnel to the Soviet Bloc on an opportunistic basis. IBM, however, set up a headquarters near Vienna 
specifically to develop these markets. At its peak, it employed some 2500 people but achieved limited 
success. 
Because few Western companies operated by opening a branch network, it became essential to establish 
ground rules for operating in the bloc. The government tried to control our activities by, for example, 
allowing us only to recruit local staff specifically approved by them. Further, we were allocated premises to 
use and to accommodate our expatriate staff. This situation turned out to be extremely complicated, time-
consuming, and difficult given the mutual suspicions and restrictions on both sides during the Cold War. 
5.2 Building the Team 
Because we expected U.K staff to live for several years in a difficult environment, we decided that it would 
best to recruit married staff, some with young families, on the basis that a family was likely to be more 
stable and, in a way, self-sufficient. The positions were attractive to some of LEO’s more adventurous 
staff, mainly men 
Few understood the conditions under which they would be working and living in a Communist country at 
that time: poor accommodation, hotels that provided strange and inadequate food, limited facilities to allow 
them to cook in their rooms, constant KGB surveillance, poor shopping facilities, and little activity for 
spouses and families. Health and education services were also not what British individuals were 
accustomed, although one of our engineers survived harrowing conditions in a Moscow hospital following 
peritonitis. Stress could be considerable: after the UK expelled 105 Soviet from the UK, the children of our 
staff attending the school at the British Embassy had to be handed out of the windows to their anxious 
parents in the face of hostile crowds outside the school. 
Nevertheless, the success of an assignment usually depended on the wife’s ability to live in that 
environment. I developed the custom of interviewing the wives to give them a picture of what conditions 
for them might be like for them and for the job applicants, who might be enthusiastic about the 
opportunities and forget the hardships. In the event, some simply could not find it possible to live under 
the restrictions that the system imposed and others perhaps became too close to the Communist regime 
and posed potential security risks, but the majority accepted the conditions. 
Some of our most successful managers were or became great linguists. Many of them had graduated in 
Slav language studies. Sepp Leimgruber and Nick Wynn were each fluent in some twelve languages; 
some spoke Russian, and most had some French, German, or Spanish. I decided to acquire a language 
laboratory and hire trainers to enable staff going on assignment to have at least a smattering of the 
language they required. 
Several staff developed interesting and highly successful careers on returning to the UK. John Durham, 
Manager of the Yugoslav branch, became a successful software developer and entrepreneur. Alexander 
Dembitz, Manager of the Hungarian Branch, set up a company that, in addition to other activities, became 
the leading supplier of bank software to international banks. Alec Nacamuli, after his tour of duty in Moscow, 
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became the key member of the team that developed the Swift bank fund transfer system. Juergen Kraus, 
Manager of the DDR branch, became an effective entrepreneur in Germany. John Bradley, after his period 
as the deputy manager of the Moscow branch, became a senior official in the European Commission based 
in Brussels. Moshe Peled, who became responsible for our Counter Trade activities, used his counter trade 
experience in his subsequent career. Don Riley, a tough New Zealander, was the first manager of our 
Moscow branch became after he left LEO, and he became a supplier of computer work stations that 
President Gorbachov recognized as an important example of the technology that the Soviet Union lacked. 
Subsequently, back in London, he became a successful property owner and by converting old warehouses 
into factories. He then founded the brilliant Chocolate Factory heater in Southwark. Roger Landau, who 
managed the Polish branch and later the Czechoslovak branch, later married a Czech woman, became an 
expert of Indian Culture, and ended up as successful farmer in Britain. 
5.3 Networking 
As part of the drive to understand the market and become widely known, we networked as extensively as 
possible through participating in governmental trade missions, exhibitions, receptions, and Chamber of 
Commerce events. We also traveled and visited companies and decision makers. Exhibitions were 
sometimes crucially important because officially sponsored exhibitions were frequently provided with 
funds to purchase the exhibited goods. These became major efforts. For the first large computer exhibition 
INCOMEX in 1966 in Prague, we sent over 100 of our staff to cover the six weeks of the exhibition to 
demonstrate our serious intent following Broido’s first successes there. 
5.4 Counter Trade 
As a consequence of the trade policies seeking self-sufficiency in the Soviet bloc, the region experienced 
a perpetual shortage of convertible foreign exchange. It soon became clear that, if we were to grow the 
market significantly, we would need to participate in a form of exchange called “counter trade” (Stevens, 
1995). Counter trade is a form of business derived from the more primitive trade known as “barter”.  
Counter trade is a form of business that enables importers short of convertible currency to purchase goods 
and services they needed by offering, instead of payment, goods and services in exchange. These were 
frequently in surplus or difficult to sell through normal channels. Although an inefficient method of conducting 
international trade, counter trade created possibilities of business that were otherwise impossible. 
We were under continuous pressure to buy a range of exotic products, such as trained falcons or racing 
camels (to resell to rich Middle East princes), various horns to grind up into medicines, and a wide variety 
of handicrafts, all of which we tried to avoid. We did try to import miniature electric motors, which turned 
out to be unreliable. Specialist companies in counter trade offered to take these types of products but at 
unreasonable prices. 
We persisted and set up our own counter trade department to avoid loss and limit the risk of trading by 
only buying what we knew we could sell on. We succeeded, for example, by identifying a small Bulgarian 
vineyard making a good quality red wine, which we were able to sell to social clubs and for events at 
home. We purchased large quantities of ball bearings from Romania for the British motorcar industry. 
Through the ingenuity of Moshe Peled, we helped to ensure the production of a successful film at the 
famous Czech film studios at Barandov near Prague to supply a large system 4 installation to the regional 
government authority of Prague. Hungary was able to produce computer cabinets to our specification. We 
purchased hanging baskets in Bulgaria for flower arrangements, which we sold to garden centers and 
even municipalities. When electric and electronic typewriters displaced manual typewriters, we found a 
ready market for small manual machines made in East Germany and Bulgaria. 
5.5 Co-operation 
We always faced further pressure to help the Soviet Union and its satellites to reduce the technological gap 
between them and the West. We were willing to be supportive provided that the assistance was in COCOM 
rules and that we would not provide any form of potential help to their military capacity (especially during the 
Cold War). Problems arose over technologies that were essentially civilian but had a possible military use. I 
negotiated frequently with a company lawyer in attendance to help with any legal issues. 
We modified a System 4 computer that that fell completely in the technical parameters defined by the 
COCOM regulations and offered it for sale but (not surprisingly) without much success. On the other hand, 
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we were permitted to supply a powerful English Electric KDF9 system for the Institute of High Energy 
Physics, partly staffed by International Scientists who demanded access to powerful state of the art 
computers. With the co-operation of the Russians, we were able to satisfy COCOM that the use of the 
computer was not in breach of the regulations by providing or Ministry of Technology with regular 
analyses of the computer output and the contents of its store. 
As I mention in Section 1, in the early days of the computer industry, Russian research and thinking about 
computer concepts was reasonably advanced and sometimes ahead of the West (Hally, 2003). Russia 
produced early computers with similar computing power as LEO 1in significant numbers, but these 
systems almost totally lacked efficient peripherals. 
For a considerable time, Russia had rudimentary designs and manufacturing capabilities for reliable 
storage (e.g., chip-based storage) and printers, magnetic tape, and drums. This situation occurred largely 
due to Stalin’s poor understanding of computers’ potential: he did not allocate enough resources to the 
industry and research. In due course, under the leadership of the State Committee for Science and 
Technology and the Academy of Sciences, the problem was recognized, and the USSR Government 
began to realize the urgent need to catch up with the West. 
Although there was a strongly argued opinion that the Soviet Union needed, for security and economic 
reasons, to become self-sufficient in information technology, a decision was taken against strong pressure 
from hard-liners to acquire already developed technology from the West, (Malinovski, 2006; Graham, 
1998). At this point, the offer of co-operation by LEO, and later by ICL, to provide some technology and 
assembly rights became attractive to influential members of the decision making bodies and in particular 
to Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, Rakovski and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and 
Technolgy, Gvishiani. However, by then, the overwhelming dominance of the IBM 360 series in the West 
became the target for the Soviet Bloc and led to the defeat of the self-sufficiency group and those wanting 
to work with LEO/ICL. 
Accordingly, the bloc developed a new plan, which would allocate all members of the Warsaw Pact with 
specific areas for developing the industry. The primary task (allocated to the Soviet Union) was to develop 
powerful computers to rival the systems of CDC and IBM. Key roles for a range of computers and 
peripherals were allocated to the DDR (East Germany) with major plants in Dresden and also, perhaps more 
surprisingly, to Bulgaria (mainly in Plovdiv) for smaller computers, disk systems, and electronic typewriters. 
The bloc implemented the new plan by smuggling several IBM 360 systems via the German Democratic 
Republic (Deutche Demokratiche Republic) to Russia, Bulgaria, and elsewhere. The countries emulated 
the hardware reasonably effectively but slowly by reverse engineering, although poor manufacturing 
techniques and high fault rates impeded success. In the meantime, the attempts to emulate the software, 
systems, languages, and applications proved to be much more difficult than expected, which led to long 
delays in the project implementation. 
6 Conclusion 
Despite IBM’s prestige and marketing strength and partly because of the United States’ Cold War attitude, 
we became a major supplier of computing equipment from the West to the Soviet Union and its satellites 
from 1970 to 1990. I believe we did so primarily because we understood the vagaries and needs of this 
particular market. Our computers were installed in the key branches of government and industry 
throughout Eastern Europe, and the area became a profitable market for LEO, EELM, and ICL. 
It has sometimes occurred to me that if, during the Cold War, as result of incipient conflict, we had 
stopped supplying spare parts for our installed computers, we would have caused chaos in the centrally 
planned economies of the Soviet Bloc. 
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